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The present environment for populist radical right (PRR) parties in Europe is favorable.1 Both 
the refugee crisis as well as the recent terrorist attacks across Europe and beyond have 
ostensibly further fuelled xenophobic and anti-Islam sentiments among European publics; it 
has been on this basis that PRR parties have arguably built their support. Recent elections in 
Europe have indeed seen gains for parties with an outspoken xenophobic message: the 
victories in March 2016 for the “Alternative for Germany” (AfD, or Alternative für 
Deutschland in German) in the German regional elections and two far right parties (SNS and 
L'SNS) in the Slovak national elections being cases in point. Moreover, opinion polls in 
countries such as France, Austria and the Netherlands equally show promise for PRR parties. 
Though not all European countries have witnessed the successful mobilization of the PRR, it 
is fair to conclude that this family of parties is fairing very well. Nevertheless, it would be too 
premature to conclude that PRR parties have only thrived on the recent salience of the 
immigration issue. 
The PRR’s cultural agenda    
Immigration certainly entails an important issue for PRR parties, which, according to Cas 
Mudde, share an ideological core of nativism, authoritarianism and populism.2 Besides its 
belief in a strictly ordered society with clear norms and lines of authority, and its populist 
anti-establishment criticism – which puts forth a positive valorization of the (ordinary) people 
and a negative portrayal of the “elites” – the PRR’s most defining characteristic is nativism. 
Mudde defines this concept as “an ideology, which holds that states should be inhabited 
exclusively by members of the native group (‘the nation’) and that non-native elements 
(persons and ideas) are fundamentally threatening to the homogeneous nation-state”. 3 
Nativism naturally correlates with hostility towards immigrants, who are inherently non-
natives. While anti-immigration rhetoric was mainly voiced by PRR parties in the western 
part of the continent in the past, the recent refugee crisis has also made immigration a more 
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significant issue in Central and Eastern European countries. Previously, relatively few (non-
Western) immigrants chose to settle in post-communist countries, and PRR parties in this part 
of Europe mainly targeted minority populations, such as the Roma. More recently, however, 
immigration has become an electoral issue in the post-communist context – with hostile 
language not only being voiced by the PRR, but also by dominant ‘mainstream’ party 
figureheads, such as Jarosław Kaczyński4 in Poland, Prime Ministers Victor Orban5 in 
Hungary and Robert Fico6 in Slovakia. 
The “supply” of anti-immigration positions among political actors is meeting  “demand” from 
citizens across Europe. Public opposition to immigration and related anxieties about the decay 
of national culture – not least due to the alleged “Islamization” of European societies – form 
the basis of PRR party support. Scholarly contributions have shown that PRR supporters are 
primarily motivated by the stances parties take on “cultural” issues, not least immigration and 
multiculturalism. 7  Socio-economic issues such as welfare redistribution and market 
regulation, it has been argued, are secondary concerns on PRR party programs, as they are to 
their voters. What is more, PRR parties ostensibly have little to gain from placing more 
emphasis on socio-economic issues, as their electorates typically constitute a coalition 
between less-educated “blue-collar” workers and petit bourgeois entrepreneurs, two groups 
with contrasting economic interests and attitudes.8 As such, analysts have suggested that it is 
sensible for these parties to devote little attention to, and even “blur” their positions on, socio-
economic matters.9    
Beyond immigration: Europe and welfare 
It would be inaccurate, however, to portray PRR parties as single-issue “anti-immigration” 
parties. For one, most are also characterized by their opposition to European integration. This 
position is also related to the PRR’s nativism: European integration is associated with a loss 
of national identity and sovereignty. The EU is generally portrayed as an undemocratic “super 
state” that threatens the native community and facilitates unwanted immigration.10 In addition, 
the PRR formulates its populist arguments against the EU: European integration is considered 
an elitist project with little regard for the “popular will”, while the EU’s decision-making 
procedures are complex and opaque.11 The recent Eurocrisis has provided PRR parties with 
further ammunition against “Europe”. For instance, various PRR parties in Northern Europe, 
such as the AfD, the True Finns (PS) and the Dutch Freedom Party (PVV), have voiced 
opposition to the bailouts for troubled Eurozone members and the pooling of more 
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sovereignty at the European level as a response to the crisis. While Euroscepticism is not the 
exclusive prerogative of the PRR party family – the radical left, for one, laments the EU’s 
neoliberal character – and though degrees of opposition vary across individual cases, the anti-
EU position is a defining characteristic of contemporary PRR parties.12    
Further, even though the prevailing consensus states that PRR parties are mainly characterized 
by their cultural agenda, there is an increasing body of scholarly research showing that 
(Western European) PRR parties are converging around what has been called a “welfare 
chauvinist” position.13 This essentially entails support of economic redistribution and the 
preservation of welfare state entitlements, whereby the non-natives (most notably: 
immigrants) are excluded from receiving welfare or have only limited access to it. This 
implies that the PRR is not necessarily “right-wing” in terms of socio-economic issues; 
indeed, PRR parties may support traditionally “leftist” causes such as safeguarding pensions 
and workers’ rights. PRR parties’ conception of welfare is, however, hardly universal and the 
exclusion from welfare of non-natives – who are often portrayed as underserving scroungers – 
is typically argued to be a precondition for the survival of the welfare state.  
The identification of welfare chauvinist appeals among PRR parties represents a departure 
from a few influential scholarly accounts from the 1990s. Notably, Herbert Kitschelt and 
Anthony McGann initially spoke of an ideological “winning formula” for the radical right in 
Western Europe, which entailed a combination of neo-liberalism with authoritarianism and 
xenophobia.14 It is still something of a moot point whether such early accounts were off the 
mark as far as the socio-economic program of the radical right is concerned, or whether the 
adoption of more “leftist” welfare protection positions by PRR parties is a relatively recent 
trend. For at least a number of cases, such as the French Front National, the latter 
interpretation appears valid.15 It is, in any case, worth noting that this debate primarily centers 
on the Western part of the continent, as many PRR parties in post-communist countries were 
geared towards defending the social rights of the “transition losers” from the outset: citizens 
who did not benefit from the transition to the free-market economy.16  
Where culture meets economy 
Whether taken as a new phenomenon or not, does the welfare chauvinist appeal of the PRR 
signify that the socio-economic agenda of this family of parties is (becoming) more relevant 
than previously assumed? On the one hand, it is possible to argue that the economic and 
welfare policies promoted by the PRR are primarily informed by their cultural agenda. 
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Ostensibly, the most important aim for these parties is to protect the natives, and the economic 
policies they advocate can also be seen in this light. On the other hand, however, it seems that 
current scholarship is too preoccupied with the analytical distinction between cultural and 
economic dimensions of political competition. It is difficult, and arguably misguided, to 
interpret the welfare chauvinism of the PRR in either economic or cultural terms; economic 
interest and identity are not as easily distinguishable as scholars often suggest. The desired 
exclusion of immigrants from entitlements may be based on identity, but welfare 
redistribution inherently remains an economic issue as well. In the same way, it would be too 
simplistic to attribute the success of PRR parties only to fear among their electorates about the 
loss of culture and identity, or anxieties about Islamic extremism. Citizens do not necessarily 
perceive cultural and material threats as clearly distinct from one another, and resistance to 
immigration is partly borne out of fears of economic competition and welfare deprivation. In 
fact, the “exclusive solidarity” agenda17 promoted by the PRR is likely to be electorally potent 
precisely because it taps into an amalgamation of cultural and economic concerns found 
among a significant share of the electorate.  
Conclusion 
In light of current events, it is clear that immigration is now primarily framed as a cultural and 
security issue. This no doubt plays into the hands of the PRR, as this is how such parties 
prefer to address the topic. This does not mean, however, that support for PRR parties will 
automatically drop when the salience of other issues rises, or when immigration is associated 
more with economic bread-and-butter issues. Ultimately, the PRR’s agenda is about more 
than cultural anxieties alone.    
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